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Summary
In addition to its primary task of achieving and maintaining price stability, the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary – MNB) views the reduction of Hungary’s 
external vulnerability as a key priority. For that reason in the spring of 2014 the cen-
tral bank introduced the Self-Financing Programme, in the context of which its policy 
instruments were restructured in order to crowd bank liquidity out of the sterilisation 
instruments and redirect it to the market of liquid securities. The Programme has met 
its initial goals as the external vulnerability of Hungary has decreased significantly. 
Between spring 2014 and December 2016 the Hungarian government repaid EUR 11 
billion of its foreign currency debt from forints, the foreign currency ratio of govern-
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ment debt lowered to around 25 per cent from the previous 50 per cent, while gross 
external debt decreased also significantly. While the primary goal of the Programme 
was to reduce Hungary’s external vulnerability, the measures were also intended to fa-
cilitate the easing of monetary conditions in an unconventional way. The yield-impact 
of the Self-Financing Programme could be around 75–90 basis points which makes 
that the Programme supplemented the yield-effect of central bank interest rate cuts 
with a magnitude of one half of their effect between 2014 and 2016.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) code: E52, E58, H63, G21
Keywords: self-financing, monetary policy, financial stability
Introduction 
Hungary accumulated unsustainable debts before the crisis started in 2007, and a 
significant portion of the debts was denominated in foreign currency. In spite of the 
series of retrenchments initiated after 2006, the deficit of the budget remained high, 
and the government debt showed an increasing trend. Household savings decreased, 
the current account deficit was significant for years, and this led to huge external 
indebtedness, while the level of foreign currency reserves was dangerously low com-
pared to external debts. The high level of indebtedness and the unfavourable struc-
ture of the debt can be considered as one of the main reasons why Hungary was hit 
hard by the global financial crisis.
The vulnerability of the Hungarian economy fundamentally determined the macro-
economic developments of the years following the crisis. The repayment of debts 
hindered internal demand for years, slowed down the recovery from the crisis and 
gradually demolished the long-term growth potential. This way the economic policy 
had to face the almost impossible task of performing a budgetary consolidation and 
laying down the foundations of sustainable growth at the same time.
The prolonged repercussions of the crisis and its escalation rendered Hungary’s 
external economic and money market environment vulnerable. This rapidly chang-
ing, unconventional environment called for new, innovative monetary policy solu-
tions. The turnaround in Hungary’s monetary policy started in the summer of 2012 
and gained momentum from March 2013. Since March 2013, the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank has played an increasingly active role and has taken proactive steps to fulfil the 
mandates bestowed upon it in the MNB Act.2
One of these proactive steps was the introduction the Self-Financing Programme 
in the spring of 2014. The programme was intended to encourage banks to purchase 
liquid assets accepted as eligible collateral with a view to mitigating Hungary’s exter-
nal vulnerability by reducing the country’s gross external debt. This study is present-
ing the concept and motivation, the structure, the phases and the results of the Self-
Financing Programme.
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Concept and motivation
At the outbreak of the crisis and in the years that followed, Hungary was counted 
among the countries that were considered vulnerable by international standards. The 
external fragility of the economy and excessive reliance on external foreign currency 
financing were among the main reasons. The main problem was that the crisis dis-
torted the foreign currency composition of public debt: the share of foreign currency 
debt surpassed the levels seen in most European Union Member States by a large 
margin. Similarly, analyses and reports on Hungary identified its high external vulner-
ability as a key risk, the reduction of which had become one of the primary objectives 
of Hungarian economic policy by 2014.
Without prejudice to its primary objective, the MNB supports the maintenance 
and reinforcement of financial stability and the economic policy of the Government 
using its disposable instruments.3 The concept aiming to reduce Hungary’s vulner-
ability by financing government debt from internal funds is aligned with the MNB’s 
objectives. A shift towards self-financing not only makes the funding of government 
debt safer, but the reduction of external and foreign currency debt will reduce the 
Hungarian economy’s vulnerability, which benefits all economic agents. Lower exter-
nal indebtedness can contribute to reducing debt-service costs by improving a coun-
try’s risk perception and decreasing the risk premium, thus also indirectly fostering 
more sustainable economic growth. Lower external debt and a healthier debt struc-
ture may reduce the country’s risk premium and contribute to reducing the costs of 
debt financing. Bringing down the economy’s gross external debt is desirable as long 
as reducing foreign exchange reserves in a prudent way is possible, and therefore part 
of foreign exchange reserves can be used to further reduce the country’s external 
vulnerability.
Reducing the external vulnerability is a relevant macro-economic objective. One 
possibility to achieve that objective can be via the modification of the operational 
framework of the monetary policy in the following way:
– As an unwanted consequence, central bank instruments with a good liquidity 
profile may encourage banks to adopt a liquidity management practice that relies 
far less on liquid securities and indirectly, this might increase external vulnerabil-
ity. Indeed, in this case, bank liquidity will wind up in the central bank’s balance 
sheet, while public debt is mainly financed by other sectors, especially by foreign 
investors, which may raise the level of external debt and increase the foreign cur-
rency ratio. 
– When the central bank’s liabilities side instrument is less liquid, by steering ex-
cess liquidity into liquid securities markets the central bank can play a more promi-
nent role and contribute indirectly to the increase of the weight of domestic sectors 
and the decrease of external exposure. Another important aspect to consider is the 
fact that, if the external exposure entails increased foreign currency issuance, it may 
cause considerable sterilisation costs for the national economy due to the expansion 
of the central bank’s balance sheet.
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Figure 1: The Self-Financing Programme framework 
INPUT OUTPUT OUTCOME
Price stability, financial stability, economic growth
I) Foreign currency 
debt refinanced from 
HUF
II) Increasing collateral 
security holdings
III) Contracting 
sterilisation portfolio
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Transformation and 
supplementation of 
monetary policy 
instruments
A) Reducing external 
financing  
B) Lowering the FX 
ratio of public debt 
C) Looser monetary 
conditions
Technical and 
operative 
eciency
Social 
benefits
(high external vulnerability, the resulting negative international 
perception, substantial surplus reserve, significant foreign currency 
debt and foreign currency maturities, significant structural liquidity 
 surplus etc.)
Source: The authors’ own editing, based on Mandl–Dierx–Ilzkovitz, 2008.
By transforming the liquidity profile of central bank instruments, the Self-Financ-
ing Programme can prompt banks to shift their funds towards liquid securities. Under 
the Programme, by modifying the central bank instruments the MNB raises, in a rela-
tive sense, the appeal of eligible non-central bank securities for banks and due to the 
specificities of the Hungarian securities market, this primarily affects government se-
curities.4 Modifications to the monetary policy instruments under the Self-Financing 
Programme facilitate the reduction of foreign currency debt and external debt and 
hence, the external vulnerability of Hungary. Indirectly and over the longer term, the 
Self-Financing Programme supports price stability and financial stability, as well as 
economic growth (Kolozsi–Hoffmann, 2016b:9–34).
Figure 2: Central banking instruments and external vulnerability
Parameters of
central bank 
instruments
(liquidity, yield, 
risk)
Banks' liquidity 
management
(central bank 
deposits vs. liquid 
securities)
Banks'' demand
for liquid
securities
Funding of
public debt
(non-resident vs. 
resident investor,
denomination)
External
exposure,
external
vulnerability
Source: The authors’ own editing
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The self-financing concept can be considered as cooperation between the MNB, 
the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) and banks. In recent years and 
especially after 2012, several policy decisions were made with a view to reducing exter-
nal vulnerability and improving the debt structure or furthering the achievement of 
these goals. The self-financing concept fit into these series of steps. It is important to 
see however that the self-financing concept is not a centrally coordinated programme, 
but rather a series of complementary measures and decisions. The success of self-
financing depends, on the one hand, on the ÁKK’s issuance of an adequate volume 
of forint-denominated government securities and on the other hand, on the ability of 
domestic investors to ensure the necessary, sufficient demand for such papers – this 
involves, in particular, the banking sector.
– It should be noted that, in addition to the natural consultation and cooperation 
between public stakeholders, individual members of the banking sector also volun-
tarily participated in the Programme. It is also important to underline that the Self-
Financing Programme do not define any requirements regarding the investment of 
the banks’ liquidity in particular assets.
Figure 3: Self-Financing Programme as cooperation between stakeholders
Self-Financing Programme
Adjustment by banks, liquid 
securities become more 
important
Increasing  demand for liquid 
securities, especially for 
government securities
Reacting to increased 
demand with increased 
government securities 
issuance
Foreign currency maturities 
refinanced from forints
Decreasing external 
vulnerability, tightening 
central bank balance sheet
MNB
Banks
ÁKK
Source: Own figure
Parallel to the reduction in Hungary’s external exposure, by 2014 the reserve hold-
ings of the central bank increased significantly, and the resulting, marked improve-
ment in reserve adequacy and accumulation of excess reserves5 over and above short-
term external debt allowed for the cautious, gradual reduction of the reserves. One 
way of utilising the foreign exchange reserves is for the state to renew the bulk of its 
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maturing foreign exchange debt in forint, as it carries out the necessary conversions 
at the MNB, against its forint deposits. The self-financing concept and programme of 
the MNB takes advantage of this possibility with the objective of reducing reliance on 
external funds.
Measures of the Self-Financing Programme
The specific measures of the Self-Financing Programme were aimed at “crowding” 
bank liquidity out of the MNB’s sterilisation instrument and “shifting” liquidity from 
the central bank to the market of liquid securities. Announced in the spring of 2014, 
the declared objective of the Self-Financing Programme was to stimulate banks’ pur-
chases of domestically issued liquid securities in order to contribute to lowering the 
external debt of Hungary and improving the currency structure of financing. The 
MNB transformed its monetary policy instruments to encourage banks to invest their 
excess liquidity in liquid securities, which, due to the specificities of the Hungarian 
environment, primarily entailed a surge in the demand for government papers.6
In the context of the programme, the MNB worked to drive the excess liquidity of 
credit institutions out of the central bank and into the domestic securities market not 
only by reforming its existing, conventional instruments, but also by introducing new, 
unconventional instruments. In addition to crowding out bank liquidity, the MNB 
also supported banks’ adjustment via instruments channelling banks’ funds to the 
desired direction. The main such channelling instrument of the Self-Financing Pro-
gramme was the conditional interest rate swap instrument (IRS),7 which has grown 
to become the iconic element of the Programme. With the introduction of the IRS, 
enabling banks to manage their interest rate risks, the MNB supported the banking 
sector’s adjustment to the reform of its monetary policy instruments by increasing 
their holdings of eligible securities.8 
The measures adopted within the framework of the Self-Financing Programme 
between 2014 and the summer of 2016 can be divided into three phases. The Table 1 
provides a brief summary of the important and relevant central bank steps as regards 
monetary policy effects.
Practically at the same time that the IRS tenders were terminated,9 the MNB de-
cided to gradually limit access to the main policy instrument. As a first step, from Au-
gust 2016 the MNB accepts deposits under its three-month deposit instrument once 
a month instead of the prior weekly frequency. By reducing the frequency of tenders, 
bank liquidity will be dispersed over three series instead of the 13, which means a 
significant concentration of deposits. As a second step, from October 2016 the MNB 
imposed a limit on the amount of bank liquidity that can be placed in three-month 
deposits.10
The reduced frequency of the three-month deposit instrument’s tenders and the 
capping of the same instrument from October 2016 mitigate money and capital mar-
ket interest rates by rechannelling banks’ excess liquidity to low-interest deposit facili-
ties of the MNB and to the interbank market. These steps represented a new opera-
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Table 1:  Measures (1) crowding bank liquidity out of the sterilisation instrument and (2) 
redirecting bank liquidity to the market of liquid securities
Measures Effectiveness
First phase 
(April 2014 – 
June 2015)11
The form of the main policy instrument 
changed: the two-week MNB bill was converted 
into a two-week time deposit
From 1 August 2014
A forint interest rate swap (IRS) instrument 
was introduced, in which the MNB would pay a 
floating interest rate against a fixed rate
From 16 June 2014
Second phase 
(June 2015 – 
January 2016)12 
The three-month, fixed interest central bank 
deposit became the MNB’s main policy instru-
ment replacing the two-week deposit, available 
to banks without quantity restrictions
From 23 September 2015
The two-week deposit facility remained a part 
of the MNB’s instruments primarily for liquid-
ity management purposes, but from the end of 
2015 the MNB limited the amount to be held 
in the instrument to HUF 1,000 billion
From 23 September 2015
The interest rate around the base rate available 
on the overnight standing facilities was made 
asymmetric
From 25 September 2015
Traditional loan tenders’ maturities were 
reduced to a half13
From 30 September 2015
The optional reserve ratio system introduced 
in 201014 was terminated, and a uniform re-
quired reserve ratio of 2 per cent was applica-
ble to all credit institutions15
From December 2015
Third phase
(January 2016)
The MNB phased out the two-week central 
bank deposit in two steps16
April 2016
Termination of IRS tenders From 7 July 2016
tional framework of monetary policy and resulted a decline in market rates by crowd-
ing out excess liquidity remaining at banks from the policy instrument. As liquidity 
crowded out can flow into the interbank market17 and the government securities mar-
ket through the Bank’s other existing deposit instruments, the resulting interest rate 
effect arises in these sub-markets, supporting the Bank’s schemes to stimulate bank 
lending and its self-financing programme as well.
The stability of the base rate in itself is an important value, as a persistently un-
changed interest rate level means greater predictability and better security of planning 
for market participants, thereby facilitating long-term economic decision-making (see 
Nagy–Virág, 2016). Bearing all this in mind, the MNB does not endeavour to reach 
the lowest possible base rate attainable in the short run, but aims at a sufficiently low 
base rate level, whose continued maintenance, facilitates the medium-term achieve-
ment of the inflation target.
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In the above described situation, by stimulating liquidity flows in the banking sec-
tor, unconventional instruments are able to contribute more efficiently to the achieve-
ment of the MNB’s objectives than a reduction in the base rate.  With the base rate re-
maining unchanged, the MNB decided to limit the access to the three-month deposit 
facility in order to ease monetary conditions in a targeted way.
In July 2016 the MNB decided to limit the access to the three-month deposit facil-
ity. As a result of the crowded-out liquidity and the banking sector adjustment, a sig-
nificant decline in yields may be achieved in the relevant financial markets, even with 
a stable base rate. As a result of a quantitative restriction on the three-month deposit, 
liquidity crowded out flows into other assets. Eventually, liquidity crowded out may 
flow through the interbank market into low-interest, overnight central bank deposits 
and to the government securities market, reducing yields in these market segments.
The amount of liquidity actually crowded out is determined by the quantitative 
limit on the three-month deposit as well as by developments in the banking sector’s 
overall liquidity in the given period. 
Results of the Self-Financing Programme
According to the impact mechanism of the Self-Financing Programme, banks’ in-
creased activity and demand in the liquid securities securities market can contribute 
to the refinancing maturing debt from forint issues and thus for reducing external 
vulnerability.
Increasing bankig sector’s demand for liquid collaterals
Since the commencement of the Self-Financing Programme the banking sector’s de-
mand for liquid securities increased significantly. It is worth emphasising that apart 
from government securities, banks also have been using mortgage, corporate and other 
bonds in their adjustment in practice. This implies that banks’ adjustment to the chang-
es in the monetary policy instruments and in liquidity requirements was largely com-
pleted. During the Self-Financing Programme, the banking sector as a whole increased 
its demand for liquid papers, and the effect on banks participating in IRS tenders was 
especially remarkable. Developments in the banking sector’s liquid securities portfolio 
largely reflect the purchases of banks taking recourse to the MNB’s IRS instrument. 
The two groups’ different behaviour suggests that the central bank’s IRS instrument was 
mainly used by banks, whose compliance with the announced modifications to the mon-
etary policy instruments and to the liquidity requirements entailed a significant degree 
of adjustment and hence considerable extra demand for liquid securities.
The Self-Financing Programme restructured the range of securities accepted in cen-
tral bank operations as collateral. The conversion of the MNB bill to deposit in August 
2014, the extension of the maturity of the main policy instrument and other central bank 
measures encouraged banks to adjust to the new framework by increasing their collat-
eral portfolio in view of the contraction of central bank liquidity. On the whole, banks 
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responded to the decline in the sterilisation portfolio by raising the volume of their other 
liquid instruments, which generated a substantial increase in their eligible collateral.
Figure 4: Eligible collaterals and central bank instruments held by counterparties
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Credit institutions began to increase their holdings of liquid securities after the 
announcement of the Self-Financing Programme. Similarly, banks’ demand grew sig-
nificantly after the introduction of IRS tenders in June 2014 and after the conversion 
of the two week MNB bill into a deposit in August 2014. Banks stepped up their liq-
uid securities purchases after the MNB’s announcement on the continuation of the 
Self-Financing Programme and on the transformation of the main policy instrument 
on 2 June 2015, which – with the exception of a temporary decline typical of the 
end-of-year period – progressively boosted banks’ holdings of liquid securities. Banks’ 
demand for securities in 2016 Q1 was driven by the announcement of the phase-out 
of the two-week deposit – which had been announced for a limited quantity – and by 
the entry into force of the 100 per cent LCR requirement in April 2016.18 
Regarding type, the increase in the holdings of liquid securities can be attributed, 
in an extended part to HUF-denominated, long-term, fixed-rate government securi-
ties.19 The share of longer-term securities in banks’ government securities holdings 
increased during the Self-Financing Programme, which improves the stability of gov-
ernment debt financing. As early as the end of 2014, the average remaining term of 
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banks’ HUF-denominated government securities rose to 3.6 years from 2.8 years in 
the previous year, and by the end of 2016 it reached almost 4 years. Instead of non-
residents, the domestic banking sector became the largest holding sector in the mar-
ket of HUF denominated government securities.
Figure 5: Share of holding sectors in the market of HUF-denominated government securities
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As the availability of sufficient liquidity is a prerequisite for lending, it is important 
to underline that although bank liquidity held in central bank instruments decreased 
in the wake of the Self-Financing Programme, this decline was offset by the purchases 
of eligible securities. This means that banks are capable of financing sound loan re-
quests, and the Self-Financing Programme did not bring about any changes in this 
regard. In other words, the purchases of liquid securities (which are especially ap-
pealing from a liquidity standpoint) do not prevent banks from financing the real 
economy. The Self-Financing Programme may even lead to an acceleration in lending 
dynamics indirectly, via the reduction in external vulnerability.20 
Repayment of foreign currency debt by forint issuances
The financing of government debt from internal funds is primarily achieved through 
the reduction of foreign currency issuance, the repayment of foreign currency bonds 
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and maturing foreign currency debt from forint funds and increased forint debt issu-
ance. All of this was made possible by domestic banks’ additional demand for liquid 
securities. From mid-2014 the Hungarian government no longer needed to borrow, 
in net terms, foreign currency for performing its instalments of international loans 
and for the refinancing of maturing foreign currency bonds, as sufficient forint funds 
were available to finance the general government.
Through banks’ increased demand for liquid collaterals and especially government 
securities, the foreign currency debt repaid by the Hungarian government from forint 
issues amounted to EUR 2.5 billion in 2014, EUR 3.9 billion in 2015 and EUR 4.6 bil-
lion in 2016. The higher supply of HUF-denominated government securities linked 
to the self-financing concept was made possible – in addition to the robust household 
demand – mostly by banks’ heightened demand. The difference between foreign cur-
rency borrowing and repayments (net foreign currency issuance) of ÁKK stood at HUF 
–766 billion in 2014, HUF –1,185 billion in 2015 and HUF –1,440 bilion in 2016. This 
represents a sharp change compared to previous years: in the years preceding the an-
nouncement of the Self-Financing Programme, the net foreign currency issuance of 
the government was either positive or close to zero.
Figure 6: Foreign currency issues and redemptions of the government
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In 2014, net foreign currency issuance turned strongly negative. Net foreign 
currency issuance declined further in 2015 and the government repaid most of its 
maturing debt from forint funds. During 2015, in addition to rising bank demand, 
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households’ sharply increasing demand for government securities also contributed 
substantially to the fact that the bulk of maturing foreign currency debt was refinanced 
from forint funds. In 2016, government financing from internal funds continued: net 
foreign currency issuance fell to HUF –1440 billion, reflecting, for a significant part, 
the last instalment of the IMF/EU credit facility.
Declining external and foreign currency debt
Assuming that non-resident investors hold the bulk of foreign currency public debt 
owed to sectors other than households, any decline in foreign currency debt lowers the 
gross external debt of the government. The self-financing concept reduces the foreign 
currency ratio of public debt as it refinances foreign currency debt with forint debt. 
In the context of the Self-Financing Programme, the foreign currency debt of non-
residents decreased, and the forint debt of domestic banks and households increased; 
accordingly, Hungary’s external vulnerability declined. Compared to 42 per cent in 
March 2014, the foreign currency debt ratio dropped to below 30 per cent in March 
2016 before falling to around 25 per cent at the end of 2016.
Figure 7: Foreign currency ratio of central government debt
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The gross external debt of the general government began to decrease in 2014, 
with the decline accelerating in 2015. The net repayment of external foreign currency 
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debt continued, while non-residents also began to reduce their forint government 
securities portfolio. Nevertheless, the financing of the general government remained 
unimpaired with domestic participants’ unprecedented surging demand for govern-
ment securities stemming from banks’ increased interest in liquid securities and from 
heightened household demand for government securities. The government, there-
fore, succeeded in reducing external foreign currency debt and forint debt simulta-
neously. During the period of the Self-Financing Programme, gross external govern-
ment debt dropped from 50 per cent to nearly 40 per cent of GDP.
Figure 8:  Decomposition of the gross external debt of the general government  
(cumulative transactions from end 2007)
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Hungary’s external vulnerability declined in 2016 and the adjustment of debt in-
dicators continued as well. Net external debt fell to nearly 20 per cent of GDP, while 
the gross external debt-to-GDP ratio declined to below 70 per cent. Considering that 
short-term external debt declined to a greater extent than the decrease in FX re-
serves, the level of FX reserves at the end of 2016 of around EUR 24 billion is still well 
above the level expected by investors (according to the most relevant indicator, the 
Guidotti-rule).21
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Easing monetary conditions
The primary objective of the MNB is to achieve and maintain price stability. Since 
2001, Hungary has pursued an inflation targeting monetary strategy which means that 
the central bank sets an explicit inflation target as the ultimate goal. Since 2007, the 
inflation target of the MNB has been 3 per cent.22
With a view to achieving the inflation target and providing sufficient stimulus to 
the real economy, between August 2012 and June 2016 the MNB lowered the central 
bank base rate from 7 per cent to 0.9 per cent. Parallel with that targeted programmes 
were implemented. The Self-Financing Programme was such a targeted non-conven-
tional programme with the declared purpose of complementing the MNB’s easing 
cycles, aligning its measures with the trajectory of conventional monetary policy.
After the announcement of the different phases of the Self-Financing Programme, 
long-term yields decreased significantly. During the first phase of the Programme in 
April 2014 the decline was significant, and a decline was observed after the announce-
ments in June 2015 and January 2016 as well.
Figure 9: ÁKK benchmark yields
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Hungarian benchmark yields have declined more sharply across all maturities 
since the announcement of the Self-Financing Programme than the Polish bench-
mark yield serving as a point of reference. If we consider the movements of Polish 
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yields as the consequence of the modification of the international environment in 
Central and Eastern Europe, we can conclude that the country-specific decrease of 
Hungrian yields was around 120-150 basis points between spring 2014 and summer 
2016. It has to be taken also into consideration that the main policy rate in Poland 
was lowered by 100 basis points between March 2014 and June 2016 while the Hun-
garian interest rate cut amounted to 170 basis points during the same period of time. 
If we substract that difference we have a decrease of 50-80 basis points in the long 
end of the yield curve which can be essentially related to the Hungary-specific Self-
financing programme.
Figure 10: Polish and Hungarian government bond market benchmark yields
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From an oither point of view we can accept that the Self-Financing Programme con-
tributed to the decline in bond yields directly through the transformation of the op-
erational framework of monetary policy and indirectly by moderating risks. According 
to the regression of Csávás–Kollarik (2016), the total effect of the Self-Financing Pro-
gramme on yields between the announcement of the Programme and Summer 2016 
could have been as high as 75–90 basis points. Meanwhile, the base rate cuts amounted 
to 170 basis points (from 2.6 per cent to 0.9 per cent); in other words, the Self-Financing 
Programme supplemented the yield-effect of central bank interest rate cuts with a mag-
nitude of one half of their effect.
114
Márton Nagy – Pál Péter Kolozsi: The Reduction of External Vulnerability and...
If we consider the cap system introduced in July 2016 as an operational framework 
partly supporting the Self-Financing Programme23, it is worth to assess the impact of 
these measures on the monetary conditions. 
As a result of the changing central bank instruments, the introduction of the cap 
system and the banking sector adjustment, relevant yields declined by 45–55 basis 
points in the main markets until the end of 2016.
Figure 11: Money market rates in the second half of 2016
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Following the announcement on 12 July 2016 about the limitation of banks’ access 
to the three-month deposit, the yield on three-month discount treasury bills declined 
by 30–35 basis, while the three-month BUBOR fell from 1 per cent to a level persis-
tently below the base rate. Following the limited tenders in October, November and 
December 2016, a further decline of yields took place. As a result, in January 2017 the 
three-month BUBOR and FX swap yields fell well below the base rate, to around 0,3-
0,4 per cent. Compared to July, the three-month discount Treasury bill decreased by 
some 50-70 basis points. 
Conclusion
The global financial crisis brought into focus the external vulnerability of the Hungar-
ian economy. For that reason Hungary identified the reduction of external exposure 
as a strategic objective. The self-financing concept – which is based on a mutual coop-
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eration between the MNB, ÁKK and banks and does not include any mandatory regu-
lation – decreases the external vulnerability by facilitating the reduction of foreign 
currency and external debt, through the refinancing of maturing foreign currency 
debt using local currency issuances.
The Self-Financing Programme affected all elements of the central bank toolkit 
while also supplementing the MNB’s instruments by an unconventional element, the 
conditional central bank interest rate swap. The reform of the monetary policy instru-
ments between 2014 and 2016 crowded bank liquidity out of the central bank and 
channelled it into the market of eligible collateral securities.
Banks have adjusted to the transformation of monetary policy instruments by down-
sizing their sterilisation portfolios and by increasing their holdings of securities eligible 
as collateral. This enabled the government to refinance its foreign currency debt with 
forint issues and to reduce gross external debt along with the foreign currency debt 
ratio. All these led to a significant reduction in the external vulnerability of the whole 
Hungarian economy between 2014 and 2016.
The Self-Financing Programme contributed effectively to the improvement in the 
external perception of the Hungarian economy. The Self-Financing Programme and 
the additional modifications to the central bank instruments were received positively 
by numerous international investors and international organisations. In their analy-
ses, institutions primarily emphasised Hungary’s reduced reliance on non-resident in-
vestors, improved resilience to external shocks, the favourable restructuring of Hun-
gary’s debt profile and the strengthening of internal financing. The improvement in 
external balance achieved as a result of the Self-Financing Programme played a key 
role in the upgrade of Hungary’s debt rating into the investment grade category.
During the period 2014–2016 instead of non-residents, the domestic banking sec-
tor became the largest holding sector in the market of HUF denominated govern-
ment securities. Through banks’ increased demand for liquid securities, the foreign 
currency debt repaid by the Hungarian government from forint issues amounted 
to EUR 11 billion in 2014–2016, and accordingly, Hungary’s external vulnerability 
declined. Compared to 42 per cent in March 2014, the foreign currency debt ratio 
dropped to around 25 per cent in 2016. Gross external government debt dropped 
from 50 per cent to nearly 40 per cent of GDP.
Concerning the effects of the Self-Financing Programme on monetary conditions 
in Hungary, the results are also impressive. The downward shift in long-term bond 
yields has been stronger for all maturities than that of Polish yields since the an-
nouncement of the Programme. The yield-impact of the Self-Financing Programme 
could be 75–90 basis points which makes that the Programme supplemented the yield-
effect of central bank interest rate cuts with a magnitude of one half of their effect. 
Supplementing the easing cycles of the MNB, the Programme generated a decline in 
both short-term and long-term yields. Over the long term, the Programme supported, 
overall, the efficient implementation of the monetary policy stance.
The Self-Financing Programme achieved monetary easing while tightening the 
central bank’s balance sheet. While numerous leading central banks managed to ease 
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monetary conditions only through unprecedented expansions of their balance sheets 
(i.e. quantitative easing programmes), thanks to the Self-Financing Programme, the 
MNB achieved this goal through a contraction of its balance sheet. The contraction 
of the MNB’s balance sheet reduced the costs associated with holding reserves, and 
the MNB edged closer to the conditions of a potentially more efficient, liquidity-pro-
viding monetary policy. 
Notes
1  This study is partly a refreshed résumé of the volume of studies “The first two years of the Self-Financing Pro-
gramme” (2016) and also includes elements from other relevant publications of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
2  For a more detailed description see Matolcsy, 2015.
3  “The primary objective of the MNB shall be to achieve and maintain price stability. Without prejudice 
to its primary objective, the MNB shall support the maintenance of the stability of the financial inter-
mediary system, the enhancement of its resilience and its sustainable contribution to economic growth; 
furthermore, the MNB shall support the economic policy of the government using the instruments at 
its disposal.” Article 3 of Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
4  It is not only a specificity of Hungarian securities markets, but also of other emerging economies in the 
European Union, where the majority of the eligible collaterals are government securities.
5  Consistent with international practice, the Guidotti indicator – a measure quantifying the country’s 
short-term external debt – is considered by the MNB to be the most important reserve strategy indicator. 
In addition, it considers other indicators preferred by investors as appropriate in assessing the adequacy 
of the reserves and identifying the relevant risks (Csávás, 2015).
6  Regarding the communication related to the Self-Financing programme, government securities were 
often used by the MNB as synonyms of eligible assets; however, the aim of simplifying the communica-
tion for public was to facilitate the explanation and the transparency of central bank decisions. 
7  Improving Hungary’s debt profile. Background material. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/banks-can-con-
tribute-to-hungary-s-self-financing-through-government-security-purchases-background-material.pdf.  
8  It is important to highlight that in case of the IRS there is no distinction between the eligible assets, the 
same incentive is provided to any of these assets.
9  The year 2016 was an important milestone for the whole Self-Financing programme, justifying the inves-
tigation of the programme from a strategic point of view, particularly concerning the further necessity of 
the IRS facility. That assessment was made in July 2016 and as a result of that investigation the conditionnal 
IRS tenders of the MNB were terminated. The following results justified the terminaton of the IRS tenders: 
– The external vulnerability of the country declined significantly. By the end of March 2016 the ratio of 
FX debt to gross government debt declined from 50 to around 30 per cent already.
    – The MNB’s balance sheet and sterilisation stock reduced. The MNB’s balance sheet and sterilisation 
stock reduced significantly resulting a remarkable saving not only to the MNB but to the whole Hungar-
ian economy. 
    – The demand for IRS facility decreased after two intensive years. The demand for the central bank 
interest rate swap (IRS) facility was intensive in 2014–2016, the IRS stock exceeds the HUF 1500 billion. 
Banks undertook to increase their stock of securities eligible as collaterals by that amount which stabi-
lises efficiently the market for liquid securities. During the spring of 2016 the demand of banks at the 
IRS tenders reduced which means that the value added of the instrument decreased. 
    – The overhaul of the monetary policy toolkit related to the Self-Financing programme was largely 
completed by spring 2016. By the termination of the two-week deposit by the end of April 2016 the main 
reason of the introduction of the conditional IRS disappeared (the IRS was introduced to facilitate the 
shift of banks from the two-week instrument of the MNB to longer maturities).
    The MNB held the last central bank IRS tender – an iconic element of the Self-Financing Programme 
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– on 7 July 2016. Termination of the instrument does not imply that the goals of the self-financing 
concept, i.e. the reduction of foreign currency debt and external vulnerability, are rejected. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the MNB reduced the frequency of the three-month deposit instrument from 
August 2016 and imposed a quantity restriction on the instrument from October 2016, thereby support-
ing the Self-Financing Programme while stimulating lending.
10  Concerning the complementary instruments see Kolozsi–Hoffmann, 2016a. 
11 Kolozsi, 2014. 
12  Nagy–Palotai, 2015. 
13  Two-week loans were replaced by one-week loans and a three-month loan was introduced to replace the 
six-month loan.
14  Varga, 2010. 
15  The reserve ratio was lowered from 2 to 1 per cent in December 2016, all other elements of the system 
remaining unchanged. The modification of the minimum reserve system supports the effectiveness of 
the new operational framework of the Hungarian monetary policy introduced in Summer and Autumn 
2016 and especially the quantitative limitation of the three-month deposit facility. In its long-term 
strategy, the MNB committed itself to endeavour to harmonise its minimum reserve system with that of 
the ECB prescribing uniform reserve requirement for all credit institutions. Apart from some technical 
questions the Hungarian minimum reserve system is fully in line with the ECB’s practice after the shift 
to the 1 per cent reserve ratio.
16  Nagy, 2016. 
17  Improving the BUBOR market, which commenced at the MNB’s initiative in the spring of 2016, was 
an inevitable prerequisite of the decline in interbank yields. Due to the introduction of the mandatory 
price quotation system, banks’ limits against each other have significantly increased, market turnover 
has notably risen, and the information content of BUBOR has improved.
18  From April 2016, the MNB raised the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirement imposed on banks to 
100 per cent. This step was implemented outside of the scope of the Self-Financing Programme.
19  Even if between March 2014 and June 2016 (the termination of IRS tenders), the most dynamic increase 
in banks’ eligible assets could be detected in corporate and other bonds whose stock increased more 
than sixfold, and the total stock of corporate, other bonds and mortgage bonds amounted to about 12 
per cent of the eligible assets.
20  SME loans started to increase dinamically in 2016. In September 2016, the annual growth rate of the to-
tal corporate lending of credit institutions was 1.8 per cent. After adjustment for the portfolio separation 
implemented within the framework of the resolution of MKB Bank, the growth rate amounted to 3.4 per 
cent. This expansion primarily reflected the increase in HUF-denominated loans. On a transaction basis, 
SME loans increased by 6 per cent in an annual comparison. The annual growth rate of the outstanding 
loans of the SME sector including the self-employed came to 7.3 per cent in the third quarter of 2016. The 
credit institution sector’s household loan portfolio increased by HUF 37 billion as a result of loan trans-
actions. Since the end of 2009, this was the first time that an increase was observed in the loan portfolio 
on a quarterly basis. The expansion of household loans outstanding is mainly affected by growth in 
loans granted to self-employers. The volume of new loan contracts increased by 43 per cent in an annual 
comparison and as part of this, housing loan output increased by 48 per cent over the past one year. 
Source: MNB, 2016).
21  For more details see MNB, 2017. 
22  A ±1 percentage point tolerance band has been designated around the inflation target in 2015.
23  If banks rechannel crowded-out liquidity to the government securities market, the external vulnerability 
of the country decreases in accordance with the spirit of the Self-Financing Programme, which also 
means a major improvement and progress for the whole economy. In addition, the ensuing decline in 
yields results in interest savings for the budget.
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